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I. INTRODUCTION
Before I went to law school, I anticipated that my most exciting
subject would be constitutional law. My interests had always run
to the philosophical, and I imagined that discussions of the
Constitution would involve deep questions of rights and freedom
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A.,
1975, Pomona College; J.D., 1980, Yale.
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and the proper relationship between citizen and state. Alas, for me
and many fellow students, our actual constitutional law courses
were nothing like what we had imagined. Instead of arguing about
the rights and duties of citizenship, we investigated, at very great
length, Marbury v. Madison1 and McCulloch v. Maryland.2 We never
assessed the morality of abortion or affirmative action, but we did
discuss whether Roe v. Wade was, or was not, derived from
Supreme Court decisions fifty years earlier about parents' decisions
regarding their children's schooling.' My time in law school
preceded the emergence of some of the current debates about
originalism and constitutional "moments," but the lesson is, I
suspect, much the same for today's law students as it was for
me-constitutional law wasn't fun in the way I had expected.
John Garvey has reminded me of the excitement I had hoped to
find in constitutional law. His book, What Are Freedoms For?,
returns to the kind of fundamental questions about the foundations
of our legal system that are so easily lost in debates about the
Negative Commerce Clause. As a result, his inquiry was a pleasure
to read-full of thoughtful and challenging arguments, and written
in a graceful yet informal style.
II. A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS
Garvey's central ambition is to overturn a conception of
freedom that, he believes, has dominated our thinking about the
Constitution and its role in securing various freedoms to the
citizenry.' That conception regards freedom as morally neutral,
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
5. Freedoms, as Garvey is concerned with them, are the traditional categories
of civil rights. Freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly are
incontrovertibly included, and association, privacy, and possibly travel clamor
for inclusion. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 13 (1996).
Freedoms are thus a subset of the larger category of legal rights. See id. at 123-26
2014
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serving only to delimit various arenas of individual choice about
how to act, but without concern about the particular choices made.
Instead, Garvey argues, our constitutional freedoms give us rights
to act in certain ways which are deemed good and valuable, not
rights to choose whether, or how, to act.
In pursuing this ambition, Garvey joins a chorus of writers who
have sought to mine our public discourse about freedom and rights.
Some of these writers argue that our political and legal relationships
are distorted by certain paradigmatic ways of describing the
relationship of citizen and state, and that we need to re-examine or
even reconceptualize those ways of talking and thinking.' Others
contend that the current state of constitutional law is deficient
because the Supreme Court regularly fails to fulfill the vision of
political life embodied in the Constitution.7 Garvey is largely
content with our current legal practice, at least as it is reflected in
decisions of the Supreme Court. What he rejects is a set of
assumptions that he believes has distorted our usual thinking about
freedom and led us to misunderstand current Court doctrines and
decisions. He aims to articulate an alternative theory of freedom
that, on his view, underlies our actual legal practice, if not the
rhetoric that so often attends it.
This is of course an ambitious undertaking, and I cannot do
justice to the depth and detail of Garvey's argument. In this review,
I focus primarily on his discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick.! In
Bowers, Michael Hardwick was charged with violating Georgia's
sodomy statute for having oral sex with another man in his own
bedroom,9 and even though the charges against him were dropped
(exploring'the difference between group freedoms and group rights).
6. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
OF POIMCALDIsCOURSE (1991).
7. See, ag., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9. The Georgia statute prohibited both oral and anal intercourse without
ostensible regard to the offender's sexual orientation: "A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN.
1997] 2015
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sought a declaration that the Georgia law was unconstitutional.10
The trial court dismissed his complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, reinstating the action. 1 The Supreme Court narrowly
upheld the state law. A five to four majority asserted that
homosexual sodomy was not one of the "fundamental liberties"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
that as a result Georgia could forbid such acts simply because its
voters thought them to be immoral.12
For many, this decision was outrageous. Prior cases, including
Griswold v. Connecticut13 and Roe v. Wade,'4 had seemed to
guarantee that a married couple's decisions about what to do in
their own bedroom was their private concern and no business of
the state. Since Eisenstadt v. Baird"5 affirmed the same prerogatives
for unmarried heterosexual couples, what could possibly justify a
different treatment for homosexuals, other than prejudice about
their sexual orientation? The Court wrongly decided Bowers on this
line of reasoning, and the decision was deeply offensive in that it
seemed to give a constitutional imprimatur to bigotry.
This sense of outrage was sharpened by the dreadful opinion for
the majority by Justice White, accompanied by an even more
dreadful concurrence by Chief Justice Burger. The majority
opinion disingenuously characterized the central issue as "the
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy."16 Styled that way, it is hard to imagine anyone taking the
S 16-6-2 (Harrison 1994). A heterosexual Georgia couple sought to join in
Hardwick's suit against the state, but was dismissed by the trial court for lack of
standing. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
10. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.
11. See id at 188-89.
12. See id at 195-96.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
16. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. "The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Id at 190.
2016
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dispute seriously; but, in that case, why did the Court grant
certiorari? The Eleventh Circuit's characterization seemed more
honest, as well as more compelling. The court stated. "The activity
[Hardwick] hopes to engage in is quintessentially private and lies at
the heart of an intimate association beyond the proper reach of state
regulation."" More powerful yet was the characterization in Justice
Blackmun's dissent proclaiming that "this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.'""
Garvey argues that this outraged reaction is founded on a
mistaken understanding of the rights in question, but not because
he endorses gay-bashing. It is a mistake, he contends, to approach
the issue in Bowers, and Griswold and Roe, as one of bedroom
privacy, where what's protected is some realm of individual
decision-making about the nature of one's sexual pleasures. To
approach Bowers in that way is to accept the conception of freedom
that he hopes to unseat. On that mistaken conception, freedom is
taken to be the freedom to choose how to behave, without regard
to the particular choice made. Instead, he contends, the
Constitution protects freedoms to act. In Bowers, the important
constitutional freedom is a freedom to love, which freedom is
paradigmatically, but not exclusively, fulfilled in a marital
relationship.
It follows from this claim that sexual gratification per se is not
constitutionally protected. As a result, Garvey would accept as
constitutionally acceptable the state prosecuting heterosexuals
under the Georgia sodomy statute, just as it prosecuted Hardwick
for his homosexual liaison." Conversely, however, he argues that
17. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (1985), rev'd 478 U.S. 186
(1986). Justice Powell was one of the majority, but after his retirement from the
Court he stated that he thought that Bowers was wrongly decided. See DWORKIN,
supra note 7, at 152.
18. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
19. However, in oral argument before the Court, the Georgia Attorney
General conceded that the statute would violate the Constitution if applied to
a married couple. See id at 218 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1997] 2017
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we must consider the possibility of homosexual marriages, and
hence constitutional protection for the bedroom conduct of
married homosexuals:
[S]urely gay lovers can satisfy other [non-sexual] needs for
each other; can admire, appreciate, respect, esteem each
other for their good qualities; can care for each other in a
benevolent way; and so on.
If that is so, and if I am correct in saying that the right
to freedom follows after the good of love, then there is a
strong argument for protecting homosexual as well as
heterosexual freedom to love. And if sexual activity is
limited to married couples, the freedom to love leads
inexorably to the freedom to marry."
But this kind of love, he notes, had little to do with Hardwick,
or his partner. Hardwick's brief in the Supreme Court explicitly
abjured any claim of a right to have a homosexual relationship
"recognized as a marriage,"21 and as Garvey emphasizes any such
claim on Hardwick's part would have been absurd, at least as
regards to his companion for that fateful encounter. Garvey notes
that:
Hardwick's sexual partner was a one-night stand-a
schoolteacher from North Carolina who pleaded to reduced
charges and left town. The courts showed little interest in
him. Hardwick's complaint was equally casual. It merely
declared that Hardwick was "a practicing homosexual who
regularly engages in private homosexual acts and will do so
in the future." The acts of sodomy were the focus; the
identity of the other actor didn't matter. . . .What
Hardwick's suit asked for was the freedom to reach an
orgasm in the particular way that he favored.'
20. GARvEY, supra note 5, at 38-39.
21. Id. at 25.
22. Id at 24-25 (endnotes omitted).
2018
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That freedom, Garvey argues, is not protected by the Constitution.
What's protected, instead, is the freedom to love-the freedom to
build and nurture some more enduring kind of relationship-and
not just the private sexual choices of consenting adults. On this
reading of the Constitution, Hardwick's claim should not trigger
constitutional protection, and Bowers was not only correct, it was
an easy decision.
I. Tim NATURAL RIGHTS THEME
This is heady and provocative stuff. To begin with, Garvey's
reading of Bowers is novel, and strikingly so. Even though he agrees
with the majority's conclusion, his argument is quite different from
anything asserted in either Justice White's majority opinion or
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence. Neither of those opinions
mentioned anything like a freedom to love. By the same token,
however, he completely rejects the dissent's perspective, which
seems grounded in a well-accepted view of privacy as a right to be
left alone, especially in one's own bedroom. Therefore, Garvey is
arguing not only that the rights in question need to be
recharacterized, but that the traditional perspective about privacy
is completely wrong.
What, on his view, is so wrong with this traditional perspective
on freedom, and if it is so wrong, how has it become as dominant
as he seems to think.) The answer to both these questions requires,
I think, an excursion into moral and political theory.
A. Two Kinds ofJustification
As I read it, Garvey's argument depends fundamentally on a
distinction between two different ways to justify freedom.3 One
23. 1 must be careful here. The distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental justifications for freedoms is presupposed but not expounded by
Garvey. As I discuss later, Garvey's argument turns essentially on two claims.
First, that our constitutional freedoms are freedoms to act in special ways.
Second, that the freedom to act is protected because that kind of action is deemed
1997] 2019 -
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kind of justification is what philosophers standhrdly call
instrumental.
When thought of instrumentally, freedoms are means to various
ends that we, as a society, desire. In following this idea, one
proceeds in something like the following steps: think of the society
we most desire; contemplate the kind of individual activities that
will, over time, lead to that desired society; and then posit certain
freedoms-areas of conduct which are privileged to be free from
governmental interference-because we think that privileging those
areas of conduct will most likely promote the activities we wish to
encourage.24
In contrast, we can also understand non-instrumental
justifications. Other terms to describe the non-instrumentalist
family of justifications would include "de-ontological" and
"absolutist." Non-instrumentalist arguments, on the other hand,
justify some action or course of conduct for its own sake and not as
a means to other desired ends. Non-instrumental justifications for
various freedoms typically invoke the "intrinsic" value of the
conduct which is held to be privileged or assert the freedom-
holder's right to be treated in a certain way. We should honor these
freedoms, on this type of argument, because the persons involved
are morally entitled to be free from any kind of interference,
governmental or other. Hence, government intrusion would be
wrong and illegitimate. Ronald Dworkin, among others, often
sounds like he is offering a non-instrumental justification of
freedoms: "[I]f someone has a right to something, then it is wrong
for the government to deny it to him, even though it would be in
the general interest to do so."2'
intrinsically valuable. Thus, the instrumentalist approach to constitutional
freedom is only half of the argument. See infra Part IV. But I think that
describing his view as presupposing an instrumentalist conception of freedom is
entirely consonant with his argument, and expresses his view in a way that can
be appropriately succinct for a book review.
24. Instrumentalist justification is often, but wrongly, conflated with
utilitarian thinking. A better understanding recognizes that utilitarianism is a
special kind of instrumentalist justification.
25. RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1977).
2020
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Garvey's argument entails that we should understand our
freedoms in instrumental rather than non-instrumental ways.
Return to his discussion of the freedom to love:
Freedom-at least the kind of freedom talked about in [the
privacy] cases-is, I suggest, valuable for reasons having
nothing to do with autonomy or politics. I think that we
attach great value to certain kinds of love, and wish to be
left free to pursue them. Love (the good) comes first, and
the right to freedom follows after it.'
In making this suggestion, he necessarily rejects a well-entrenched
tradition of political discourse which leads to the assumption that
freedoms must be thought of in non-instrumentalist terms.
B. The Natural Rights Paradigm
Within our western tradition of political theory, the most
salient type of non-instrumental justification for freedoms has been
based on some notion of natural rights. Consider the standard form
of this argument, recognizable in the political philosophies of
Hobbes and Locke. The starting point is to imagine what life would
be like if there were no government, a lawless condition which is
now famously termed the "state of nature." In the state of nature,
the argument goes, there could be no apparatus for law-making and,
equally important, for law-enforcing. As a result, according to
Hobbes, in the state of nature we would each have a full array of
"rights" that entitled us to do entirely as we might desire.' Because
such rights are ours in the pre-political state of nature, and because
they are related in various ways to our nature as human beings,
these rights are styled "natural.""
Hobbes and Locke are famous for recognizing that this
26. GARVEY, supra note 5, at 28.
27. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 85 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
MacMillan 1947).
28. See id at 84-85.
1997] 2021
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condition of bountiful freedom would be not paradise but rather an
unfortunate, even grim existence. Without laws, and the state to
enforce them, we would all be prey to each other's whims and
desires, without protection for ourselves, our families, or our
property. Our relations to each other in the state of nature would
be, as Hobbes phrased it, a continual conflict in which each of us
was the enemy of everyone else, without rest or relaxation.29 As a
result, life in the state of nature would be, in his most famous
phrase, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."30 Hobbes and
Locke both contended that those who lived in the state of nature
would be led by rational self-interest to give up most (as Locke
argued) or all (as Hobbes argued) of their natural rights in exchange
for the advantages of civil society. In particular, they claimed, we
would be led to enter into a "social contract" under which.,we
would surrender many, or all, of the freedoms we would "enjoy"
in the state of nature on the condition that our fellow citizens
would do the same as well, each of us agreeing to accept the rule-
making and -enforcing authority of some kind of government.3'
Although Locke and Hobbes began with a common appeal to
the state of nature and the rationality of a social contract, they
29. See id at 82.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every
man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength,
and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition,
there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building;
no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and




31. See id at 109-112; JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL




diverged as to the sort of contract that each thought would be
acceptable to those living in the state of nature. For Hobbes, the
only form of government that could succeed in taming the
citizenry's unruly and competing desires would be an absolute
monarch, and so the only rationally acceptable contract would be
one under which the citizens surrendered all their natural rights in
exchange for the monarch's protection. 2 Locke was more
optimistic about our capacity for social living. He argued that we
would need to surrender many, but not all, of the prerogatives we
had in the state of nature and that we would choose instead to
retain some of our "natural" rights as claims to be made against the
government and as checks against its possible intrusions and
abuses.3
C. The Legacy of the Natural Rights Paradigm
Political theory has advanced considerably since these early
versions of the social contract, but the hold of the natural rights
idea can be seen still in the vision of freedom that Garvey hopes to
unseat. If one thinks of freedoms as originating in the state of
nature, then it seems almost automatic to suppose that they have
two intrinsic characteristics. First, if freedoms are derived from
natural rights they will need no particular justification. To the
contrary, what must be justified is the state's intrusion into some
otherwise private, and privileged, arena of individual choice. This
presumption of validity follows from the retained-rights facet of the
social contract argument. We begin, on that argument, with a
bundle of rights which are ours "naturally" and which we retain in
civil society unless we bargain them away as consideration for our
safety and security. Thus, one must assume that our retained rights
are legitimate, and the government must assume so as well.
It is easy to extend this conception of presumptively valid
retained rights so as to embrace the claim that we have a right to be
32. See HOBBES, supra note 27, at 112.
33. See LOCKE, supra note 31, at 66-72.
1997] 2023
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2013
free from governmental interference in our sexual choices. Under
the natural rights paradigm, the more private or intimate the realm
of conduct, the less appropriate it would be for the state to attempt
to regulate it-an inference that would seem to apply in spades to
our bedroom pleasures. In the first place, our intimate behavior
seems so personal and so constitutive of our identities, that it is
highly unlikely we would have agreed in a social contract to
surrender our rights to do as we please in our own bedrooms. In
the second place, private conduct between two consenting adults
seems in general so unlikely to harm the body politic that the
government could have no legitimate reason to try to regulate that
conduct. Any attempt to control our sexual lives could only
indicate that the government was hoping to increase, illegitimately,
its power over us. The realm of private consensual sexuality would
thus seem to be an arena in which we have retained our rights and
into which the state cannot properly intrude. Bowers must be
wrong, on this argument, because it accepts government intrusion
into the bedroom, a conclusion that seems confirmed by the prior
decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe.
A second feature of freedom, as conceived under the natural
rights paradigm, follows from the first. In the state of nature we are
free to act as we desire, but also free to not act if that is our
preference. Therefore, our freedoms are both complete and
exclusive. Our course of action is entirely ours to determine, and
there is no a priori reason to value one choice over any other. By
extension, when we move to civil society, our retained rights are
still complete and exclusive, and there would still be no a priori
reason to value one choice over another.34
This sense of completeness and exclusivity that attaches to our
retained rights means, among other things, that each individual
must be left free to determine the dimensions, and direction, of his
or her own sexuality. I alone am entitled to choose whether I will
34. Garvey quotes from Bentham's infamous credo that, as far as
utilitarianism is concerned, "'the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts
and sciences of music and poetry.'" GARvEY, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD 206 (1825)).
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have sex, and with whom, and neither the state nor my fellow
citizens have any grounds for objecting to my choice of sexual
positions or partners, so long as they are adult, competent, and
consenting. For this reason, the decision in Bowers seems so
profoundly offensive because it accepts the state's claim that it can
regulate my choice of pleasures.
In sum, the natural rights paradigm leads easily and naturally to
a kind of non-instrumentalist view of sexual privacy-so naturally
and so easily, in fact, that it sometimes becomes hard to think about
freedom in any other way.
D. Rejecting the Paradigm
No matter how "natural" it might seem to think of our
freedoms as derived from retained rights, there are ample reasons
to reject the social contract argument as it is standardly formulated
and, concomitantly, to reject the legacy of that argument as it has
shaped our thinking about rights. To begin with, the argument's
basic presuppositions fail. Few, if any, of us were in a state of
nature before deciding to join the body politic, and so the social
contract, if there is one, can't be understood in terms of any actual
agreement that we made with the state or our fellow citizens."
35. Some have sought to revise the social contract argument so as to defend
it in terms of some "hypothetical" agreement we would have accepted had we
been naturally "free" in the way hypothesized by Hobbes and Locke.
Unfortunately, this variant is no more tenable than the original. The weakness
of arguing in terms of some such hypothetical agreement can be illustrated by
the following example. If I had been stranded in the desert for several days, then
I would undoubtedly be willing to pay a very large sum of money for a drink of
water. But even the most rapacious vendor knows that there are limits to what
I can be expected to pay for water when I'm not in the desert and drinking water
is easily available, and no one would expect to convince me that I was somehow
obligated to pay the same price I would have accepted when I was actually in the
desert and racked by thirst. What I would have done had conditions been
different simply does not, by itself, give rise to any obligation to act in a certain
way now, when conditions are as they are.
The hypothetical agreement idea is actually a disguised version of a quite
different argument. What I would have done, had the conditions been different,
1997] 2025
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Therefore, the retained rights idea needs, at the very least, some
further justification, and in any event, should not be supposed to be
the only way to think about the relationship of citizen and state.
The state of nature idea seems particularly inapposite when
considering our own constitutional beginnings. When our
forefathers joined together in founding the Republic, they
exchanged one form of government for another, and struggled
mightily to agree on our particular Constitution, ultimately
choosing it from among many divergent possibilities. How could
some notion of retained rights derive from that situation? Rather,
it makes more sense to suppose instead that in our founding we
"bargained" for a form of government in ways more like one
bargains for services, or a car. In some contracts, like purchase of a
car, we confront various packages of options which we might or
might not want to include and then decide, on balance, to pay a
particular price for a specified make, model, and style of
government. In others, like choosing the family doctor, we commit
ourselves to an open-ended arrangement, in which the details of the
services we will receive will be decided in the future as our needs
become more clear.
On either of these alternative assumptions about our
constitutional beginnings, the retained rights paradigm loses
whatever grounding it might have had. As a result, we can
challenge any supposition that our freedoms are justified in some
non-instrumental way. Instead, we can ask quite cogently, what is
the instrumental justification of some asserted freedom, or of some
asserted interpretation or extension of an already recognized
freedom?36 What, in other words, is the value to us of some
only reveals certain facts about my tastes and preferences. Once those preferences
are revealed, I can perhaps be held accountable for actions which are inconsistent
with those tastes, but not obligated to act as I would have, had my lot been
different than it is.
36. A further important feature of the traditional social contract argument
is that it views the "terms" of the social contract as frozen and necessarily
unmodifiable, once the contract is consummated. This is most easily seen as a
corollary of Hobbes' version of the argument. Because the only rationally
acceptable contract is for Hobbes, one in which the citizenry foreswear all their
2026
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particular freedom which we "bought" as part of the Constitution?
Returning to the issues of sexual privacy, one can now better
appreciate Garvey's argument that Bowers was not really about
some right to have orgasms in the way one desires; it was instead
about the freedom to love. For Garvey, the value of any supposed
freedom of intimate association is the value of love. He states:
"There is general agreement in our society that entering a
heterosexual marriage is a very good thing, and for that reason we
protect the freedom to do it."3 This freedom to love would have to
be extended to marriage between homosexuals, if such marriage
natural rights in exchange for the protection of an absolute monarch, there is no
room in the argument for a modification of the contract. There aren't any other
versions of the social contract which would, on his view, be rationally
acceptable.
Much the same result occurs under Locke's version as well. There is an
ambiguity in the Lockean argument as to whether the social contract is entered
into between the people, on the one hand, and the monarch, on the other, or
instead between each of the citizens and each other citizen. Either argument
means that a change in the social contract could be validated only by a
modification accepted by each of the parties. As a result, the logistics of a valid
modification are insurmountable. Suppose that the contract is between each
citizen and all the rest. The contract could be modified validly only if all the
contracting parties agreed to the same modification at the same time. Similarly,
if the contract is between each of the citizens and the monarch, no citizen would
agree to any modification of her contract with the monarch unless she got as
good a deal, or better, than any other citizen got in his renegotiation. In other
words, each of the contracting parties could veto the proposed modification.
Securing that unanimous consent, when each of the potential modifying parties
knows that it can kill the deal by refusing to go along, would be daunting, to say
the least.
In contrast, if we abandon the idea that the government was formed in some
kind of social contract, we can think more optimistically about the prospect that
the body politic could validly agree to amend the governmental "bargain."
Moreover, if the body can amend, then it can ask sensibly of each term of the
contract, what is the value of that term? Does the benefit from retaining some
freedom outweigh the potential gain that might be realized by negotiating away
that freedom in exchange for some other? Thus, the capacity to amend leads us
to think in instrumental terms about the value of each freedom which is
protected by the Constitution.
37. GARVEY, supra note 5, at 40.
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becomes legally recognized, but it need not be extended to casual
promiscuity between adult partners, whatever their sexual
orientation.
IV. AN ELEGANT ANALYSIS
I am persuaded that we should think instrumentally in
analyzing our constitutional freedoms. As a result, one part of
Garvey's enterprise-to justify instrumental as opposed to non-
instrumental thinking about constitutional freedoms-seems well-
taken. But Garvey aims at far more than just this conceptual claim;
he also hopes to illuminate the particular instrumental justification
for 'various of our freedoms. Viewed from this perspective, the
analysis of Bowers and the privacy cases is admirable. As I noted, his
reading of the privacy cases is novel-the freedom to love was not
articulated by any of the opinions which were rendered. Indeed, I
find Garvey's discussion more respectable than the majority
opinion. As a result, I am now more optimistic that there might be
some principle to be articulated in support of the Court's decisions
and am correspondingly less disappointed with the Supreme Court
than I had been.
A. Other Freedoms, Other Values
However, there is a great deal more to Garvey's argument. His
analysis of Bowers and the privacy cases is just one part of his
analysis of our constitutional freedoms." Other freedoms, speech
and religion in particular, are similarly examined and
38. 1 am frustrated that, even in a review as long as this, I cannot do justice
to the elegance of Garvey's argument. Subtle and sophisticated twists spice up his
discussion at various points. For example, in re-examining Bowers and the marital
privacy decisions, he turns, by way of contrast, to the Court's decisions about
men's clubs, especially those organizations like the Jaycees, which in their self-
description purport to be both professional growth organizations and yet in
litigation would present themselves as safe harbors for personal and private
relationships among the members.
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recharacterized in ways that illuminate the value of some freedom
to act, instead of a freedom to choose. Indeed, while I am ultimately
unsatisfied with Garvey's argument, I must applaud the careful and
elegant way in which he has developed and defended his thesis.
Consider, for instance, his analysis of freedom of speech. This
freedom is commonly described as protecting some kind of "market
place" in which ideas are somehow the subject of commerce, each
finding its appropriate value in so far-but only in so far-as it is
prized by the citizenry. As Garvey notes, however, the image of
ideas being "exchanged" on the market is plainly wrong-headed.
Suppose I sell you my book. After the transaction, you have my
book, and I don't; in exchange, you paid me money, which I now
have and you don't. However, our traffic in ideas doesn't operate
in any manner comparable to this kind of transaction. If I "sell" you
my ideas, then after the "transaction" is completed we haven't
exchanged positions. To the contrary, we end up with the same
perspective; my ideas have been added to your stock of beliefs, not
substituted for them.
The pattern of Garvey's argument should, by now, be
predictable. First, the traditional way of thinking about the
freedom in question is challenged.- "The market metaphor is wrong
in its assumptions about value and the market.... Freedom of
speech is not just a process for maximizing individual self-interest,
but a rule for protecting an important human good."39
Then, in its place is offered an alternative view which begins
with a more fundamental value, such that the freedom is
constitutionally enshrined in order to advance that value: "One of
the most important reasons why we protect freedom of speech is
that speech-assertion, conversation, debate, publication-is the
pursuit of knowledge, an activity that is intrinsically good."'
If freedom of speech is indeed founded on the value of the
pursuit of knowledge then we can reflect in a more insightful way
on the dimensions of constitutional protection which has, and has
39. GARVEY, supra note 5, at 65.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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not, been afforded to different forms of speech-related conduct.
Garvey states:
Suppose that what I have just said about the pursuit of
knowledge is true. What, if anything, does that show about
freedom of speech? Here I argue that speech is the way we
pursue knowledge, just as climbing is the way we ascend
mountains. In addition to making that point; I will qualify
it in two ways. First, I will argue that not all speech counts
as the pursuit of knowledge. That is one reason why some
forms of speech do not get first amendment protection.
Second, I will argue that sometimes we pursue knowledge
by acts other than speech, and that when we do so they
deserve the same freedom we allow for speech.41
Thus, on Garvey's view, neither pornography nor much of what
has been termed "commercial" speech is entitled to the same kind
of constitutional protection as other, more central, forms of speech
because the former don't involve the pursuit of knowledge. Instead,
they simply serve to stimulate a desire in the listener-a desire to
buy the offered services or goods. While those desires, and their
satisfaction, may be important to the economy, they don't involve
the good associated with the pursuit of knowledge, and accordingly
don't deserve the same constitutional protection.
His analysis of freedom of religion proceeds along similar lines.
He rejects the leading theories of such freedom and offers instead an
instrumental justification of the freedom, based on an assumption
of the value of religion and religious practice. In particular, he
notes: "The best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the
assumption that religion is a good thing. Our Constitution
guarantees religious freedom because religious people want to
practice their faith."42
This argument, in turn, helps to explain certain anomalies in the
41. Id- at 69.
42. Id at 49.
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scope of protection accorded to religious and near-religious
practices. Religious freedom, on this argument, is only available to
those who are committed to certain practices and positions because
of their religions; it is not similarly available to those who act out
of commitment to some non-religious principle, no matter how
deeply held.
. Freedom Is a Many Splendored Thing
Garvey's analyses of these different freedoms are each
interesting and thoughtfully argued. Any one of them would be
deserving of longer discussion. But, to my mind, what's more
important than the artfulness of the individual analyses is the depth
of his larger argument about the nature of constitutional freedom.
The different recharacterizations of freedoms of speech, religion,
and association are offered up as a package which, taken together,
provide wide-ranging support for Garvey's claim that we have
systematically misunderstood the Constitution's freedoms. His
claim for an instrumental view of constitutional freedom gains
support to the extent that he can offer plausible readings of a
variety of freedoms; the more comprehensive his theory, the more
plausible it becomes.
Moreover, the recharacterization of constitutional freedoms is,
even taken as a whole, only a part of Garvey's overall argument.
Over the course of his discussion, what emerges is a subtle four-part
theory about the nature and scope of our freedoms-consisting of
(1) acts, (2) actors, (3) constraints, and (4) the state-which together
support his understanding of freedoms in a non-traditional,
instrumental way. With this multi-part analysis, Garvey can explain
diverse and surprising facets of constitutional law.
Consider, in this connection, the constitutional status of
children and the mentally disabled. Children are, of course, a
notorious constitutional anomaly in that they enjoy some, but not
all, of the freedoms accorded adults, and any respectable theory of
Supreme Court decisions must be able to explain the anomalies as
well as the central and paradigm cases. So it is for Garvey's analysis.
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Constitutional freedoms are freedoms to act in certain ways which
our society deems intrinsically valuable. But "actions" surely
involve more than just behavior. Behavior must have certain
characteristics in order to qualify as action; then, and only then, can
we ask if it is valuable. Understanding the criteria for actions leads,
in turn, to an understanding of the nature of the actors. In the usual
case, the actors are individual, adult citizens who have the capacity
to deliberate about their lives and the values they seek to fulfill, and
the citizens' actions are taken in an effort to fulfill those values.
An actor, in other words, must have the capacity to engage in
full-fledged practical reasoning in order to produce for society the
kind of value for which constitutional protection is intended.
However, children and the mentally deficient characteristically lack
some part of this capacity to engage in practical reasoning, and so
their actions generate less of the value which is expected to result
from constitutional protection. Thus, the apparent anomaly
regarding children is explained as follows: the actions of children,
and the mentally deficient, don't produce the same value that we
expect from the actions of adults, and therefore they are entitled to
less in the way of constitutional protection.
Garvey's four-fold analysis of the nature of freedoms is both
subtle and far-reaching and allows him to integrate diverse realms
of constitutional law, some of which are far removed from the
usual topics of civil rights law. In the first place, this analysis
promotes a theoretical insight about the dynamic of constitutional
freedoms. It seems simple and straightforward to recognize that if
constitutional freedoms are freedoms to act in certain valuable
ways, then constitutional law must focus on both the acts and the
actors. It is less obvious, but no less important, to recognize that if
the Constitution protects various freedoms to act from
governmental interference, then constitutional law must also focus
on the nature of the government and its constraints. Garvey writes:
"Freedom is a game played on both sides of the ball, just like
football. In constitutional law the team on the other side of the ball
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is the government."43 Scholarship about constitutional freedoms has
not commonly recognized the significance of that other "team."
Garvey points out:
It has always struck me as odd that although we have a
fairly refined set of categories for protected acts ... we
seldom think about constraints... in these terms. There are
lots of cases holding that x is (or is not) "speech" in the first
amendment sense. There are hardly any holding that y is (or
is not) an "abridgment." There are also lots of cases holding
that x1, x2, and x3 are different categories of speech with
different rules and (sometimes) different levels of
protection. But we don't hear courts say that yl, Y2, and y3
are different categories of abridgment with different rules
and levels of prohibition."
Garvey, of course, can't rectify that imbalance by himself, but he
spends a substantial portion of the book investigating and
illuminating the complexities both of government constraints on
freedom, like taxes and regulation,4' and of the government itself,
43.ILL at 157.
44. Id at 164.
45. For example, one of the parts of constitutional law that has always left
me perplexed, and frustrated, has been the doctrines regarding the government's
prerogative to withhold certain benefits. Governments, both national and local,
can hire and fire various employees, assist the poor and infirm, and subsidize
commercial benefits. The state need do none of these things and could therefore
choose to withdraw these benefits. However, can a government withdraw these
benefits in a way that depends on the recipient compromising some important
right? Can, for example, a government fire an employee for campaigning for
political office?
For some time, the Supreme Court's decisions seem to have been dominated
by a particular theory which is often expressed in terms of "greater" and "lesser"
powers. Garvey sketches this theory in a few easy strokes:
Government benefits often come with conditions attached. Even when
the conditions are unpleasant the government will justify them by
arguing that the greater power includes the lesser. "Everyone agrees that
we can absolutely refuse to give you B (the greater power). We are not
1997] 2033
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2013
as it might impinge on freedom's exercise.
V. SOME METHODOLOGICAL DISCONTENT
These investigations are rich and thought-provoking. But,
however much I admire Garvey's breadth and elegance, I am
ultimately unpersuaded by his argument. To illustrate my
disagreement, I return to the problem of privacy. In my view,
Bowers was a terrible result because I want to keep the government
out of my bedroom. This is not just a matter of my personal
preferences when it comes to bedroom pleasures. I happen to
believe that no good could ever come of the state meddling with
my sex life, nor with anyone else's. I therefore regard it as a
fundamental premise of sound political organization that my
intimate decisions, as well as those of other competent adults,
should be protected as our own private business.
I can, by the way, provide a completely instrumental
justification for this position. Reserving a large arena of individual
privacy, free from governmental scrutiny, will provide the best
opportunity for individual citizens to develop their own lives, as
they see fit, and ensure the greatest respect for the different choices
they make as part of that development. Similarly, keeping the
government from regulating my most intimate choices will limit
the power of the state and make it more likely that the state must
secure my genuine consent in order to retain its authority.
Therefore, I don't need any assumptions about the citizenry's
"retained rights" in order to conclude that a limited state is
preferable to a more intrusive one when it comes to intimate
matters and that our laws should restrict the government's power
by protecting my "right" of privacy.
While keeping the state out of the bedroom is part of what I
think ought to be the reigning theory of constitutional law, I must
so hardhearted. We will give you B if you will do C (the lesser power).
How can you complain about that?"




acknowledge that my view does not accord with the current state
of the law. My view isn't entirely foreign. After all, one of the most
attractive features of our Constitution is just its general adherence
to the premise of limited government, and my credo of what ought
to be the law is an extension of that premise into a realm where,
unfortunately, many of our forefathers thought it appropriate to
meddle. However, it is clear that the Supreme Court's decisions
simply don't follow my thinking.
For Garvey, this discrepancy is fatal. His fundamental goal, in
this book, is to develop a theory which agrees with and makes sense
of the Court's decisions. In this respect, his effort is most aptly
compared to that of a scientist who advances a hypothesis that he
thinks will match the recorded data. Garvey's view of bedroom
privacy should be accepted, he would contend, and my view should
be rejected, because his view accords with the "data," and mine does
not.
For just this reason, Garvey rejects what are standardly called
autonomy theories about constitutional privacy. Such theories, as
Garvey observes, stress
the idea that each person is an end in himself, a kind of
sovereign over a kingdom of one. This is the most basic fact
about the moral world.... All of us are equal and free to
shape our own destinies. And it is good for us to do so.6
Autonomy theories are frequently advanced to explain other
freedoms-speech and religion among them-and one might well be
drawn to such a theory in connection with privacy as well. But, as
Garvey argues, such theories simply don't accommodate all the
"data" of the Supreme Court's cases on privacy and choice:
The most serious flaw in the idea that freedom is at the
service of choice is that it explains too much. It suggests that
the law should respect a great variety of choices. But in our
46. Id at 23.
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system some choices get more protection than others.
Consider this simple fact. If Hardwick had been caught
engaging in the practice of optometry rather than sodomy,
and if Georgia had had a law against it, there is scarcely a
judge in America who would have defended his freedom to
act as he did.47
Thus, an autonomy theory, without more, fails in Garvey's eyes as
a satisfactory theory of our constitutional freedoms because it
cannot explain those areas of individual choice which do not receive
constitutional protection. Put differently, an adequate theory of
constitutional freedoms must ultimately explain why some, but not
all, desirable freedoms are protected by the Constitution.
However, this constraint about the adequacy of a theory of
constitutional freedoms highlights my problems with Garvey's
approach. Garvey makes two fundamental claims in arguing that
we should re-think and recharacterize our constitutional freedoms.
First, he argues that each freedom is accorded constitutional
protection because that freedom, properly understood, is a freedom
to act in a special way. Second, the freedom to act in that special
way is protected because that kind of action is deemed intrinsically
valuable. So the instrumentalist approach to constitutional freedom
is only half of the central argument. The other half is a claim about
values-namely, about the values he thinks our freedoms will
advance. Recall his central claims about the value of love, religion,
and the pursuit of knowledge:
There is general agreement in our society that entering a
heterosexual marriage is a very good thing, and for that
reason we protect the freedom to do it.48
The best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the
assumption that religion is a good thing. Our Constitution
47. I at 24.
48. Id at 40.
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guarantees religious freedom because religious people want
to practice their faith.49
One of the most important reasons why we protect freedom
of speech is that speech-assertion, conversation, debate,
publication-is the pursuit of knowledge, an activity that is
intrinsically good. 0
These passages confirm that Garvey's thesis depends on both
claims-an instrumentalist understanding of freedoms and a claim
about the value of the special kinds of action. However, they also
reveal a fundamental and quite troubling ambiguity in Garvey's
argument." Just whose beliefs count in this formulation? This is a
49. Id at 49.
50. Id at 65.
51. There is, upon inspection, another ambiguity in this way of thinking
about constitutional freedom. Does the Constitution protect certain freedoms
because they advance values which are intrinsically good, or does it instead
protect those freedoms because they serve values which are believed to be
intrinsically good? The difference between these two possibilities is quite
significant, and they need significantly different kinds of arguments in support
if we are to be persuaded that either can ground an adequate and appealing
theory of constitutional law.
In many respects, it seems that Garvey would like to advance a claim that
our constitutional freedoms protect activities which are intrinsically good. At
times, he says as much. The pursuit of knowledge, he contends, is intrinsically
good and hence speech, as the way of carrying out that pursuit, deserves
constitutional protection. Similarly, he asserts that "love is a good thing. It is an
essential part of a good life. One who lived without loving and being loved
would be less than human." Id at 28.
But, however much it might agree with the rest of Garvey's enterprise to
argue that constitutional freedoms protect the intrinsically valuable, there are
two fatal objections to reading him in this way. First, at no point does Garvey
provide anything like a theory of intrinsic goodness. He makes no claim about
what things are, or are not, intrinsically good, or how we might recognize those
that are, other than to assert freedom of speech, religion, and love are good. In
this connection, his argument could be linked to the work of John Finnis who
has argued that certain kinds of basic activities are fundamentally, and inarguably
good. SeeJOHN FRTrNN, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). Finnis
argues that life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical
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central, but unaddressed question, and it doesn't seem that Garvey
can answer it in a satisfactory way.
One way to answer this question, common in discussions of
constitutional law, links our understanding of the Constitution to
the beliefs, attitudes, or purposes of those who were involved in the
drafting and enactment of the Constitution. The most common
version of such an argument, for example, depends on claims about
the "intent" of the Constitution's "framers."5 2 For Garvey to take
this approach would mean developing his argument in the
following way: certain freedoms receive constitutional protection
because protecting them secures the rights of the citizenry to act in
ways that our founding fathers thought intrinsically good.
This move seems plausible enough to explain why there is
constitutional protection for freedom of speech and religion,
because they each receive distinct and explicit notice in the
document's text. However, freedom to love, which Garvey claims
underlies the right of private association, is a far more troublesome
case for this kind of argument. Privacy, unlike speech and religion,
is not mentioned in the Constitution. In the now standard, but
unsatisfying terminology, privacy is an "unenumerated" right." In
reasonableness and religion are all "basic goods," in that every reasonable human
being must, he contends, accept their value as the objects of individual striving.
See id at 59-99. But, while Gar.ey may well find Finnis' argument congenial, he
has failed to advance it, as any other grounds for our accepting the claim that
knowledge, love, or religion are intrinsically good.
Secondly, Garvey is advancing a theory of constitutional law which is, in
particular tried to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Whatever
theory of intrinsic goodness Garvey might provide, he would also have to
establish that the Court's decisions can be plausibly regarded as reliably
connected to those intrinsically good things. That argument would be more than
Herculean. Accordingly, I focus in the text on the connection between the
Court's decisions and values which are believed to be good.
52. 1 happen to think that arguments of this kind are silly, and misguided as
a way to understand the Constitution or to appreciate its significance. However,
that is well beyond the scope of this review.
53. I regard the distinction between "enumerated" and "unenumerated"
rights as completely specious when applied to debates about constitutional
adjudication. As Ronald Dworkin notes, constitutional controversies do not
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a notorious passage of the majority opinion in Griswold, Justice
Douglas asserted that the right of privacy is to be found in
"emanations" from "penumbras" of the Constitution's explicit
language.'M The invocation of emanations and penumbras, like some
witch's familiars, is necessary precisely because the Constitution at
no place asserts a right of privacy.
In the eyes of some, of course, this omission is dispositive-if
the Constitution doesn't mention the purported right then it's no
right at all. But Garvey is not troubled on this score. He still
regards private association, and the freedom to love, as a proper
part of the Constitution. He says as much,5 and even if he didn't
say it, he would be compelled on pain of inconsistency to regard
privacy as a legitimate constitutional right. As I've noted, he
undertakes to explain and rationalize the Supreme Court's decisions
as they have been propounded. Those decisions are the data his
theory seeks to explain and rationalize. As a result, he must accept
both Griswold and Roe, as well as Bowers, and so must accept that
a right of privacy is properly part of our Constitution, whether or
not the text mentions any such right.
Still, accepting privacy as a legitimate constitutional freedom
raises great difficulties for any argument that grounds constitutional
protection on the beliefs of the country's founders. If our freedoms
are constitutionally protected because they were believed by the
founders to ensure certain intrinsically valuable activities, how is it
possible that the founders failed to enumerate either privacy or love
as one of the rights worthy of constitutional protection? The issue,
again, is not just whether the founders thought privacy valuable,
but whether they thought it worthy of constitutional protection,
arise about whether we have a freedom of speech, but rather about whether we
have a "right" to burn the flag in some protest. See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at
79-80. The Constitution certainly doesn't articulate any such right of flag-
burning, and so the conclusion that flag-burning is protected under the guarantee
of free speech involves going beyond the text in one or more important ways.
Would it then follow that the "right" to burn the flag is "unenumerated"?
54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
55. See GARVEY, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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and their failure to mention the right indicates instead that
they-the very drafters of the text-did not regard it as important.
Yet, it is the founders' intent that is crucial on this type of
argument. Thus, their failure to esteem the right in question entails
that it's not worthy of constitutional protection.
Garvey can't have it both ways. He can't base his argument
about the value of our freedoms on some claim about the founders'
beliefs and also conform to his self-imposed desideratum that his
theory explains the existing set of Supreme Court decisions. He
must instead provide some other grounding for the Supreme
Court's judgments about the intrinsic value of the actions which
our freedoms protect.
As an alternative, he could argue that the Supreme Court's
decisions enforce our own, roughly contemporaneous, judgments
about what is intrinsically valuable. Various aspects of Garvey's
analysis suggest that this is, indeed, the underlying idea. For
example, in discussing the freedom to love, he claims: "There is
general agreement in our society that entering a heterosexual
marriage is a very good thing .... 6 As an added bonus, this move
could avoid the troubling lack of evidence about the founders'
beliefs by depending instead on our own current beliefs about the
freedoms that deserve constitutional protection.
Nevertheless, however promising it might seem at first glance,
this alternative is unavailing as well. Return again to Bowers and the
problem of sexual privacy. Garvey argues that the fundamental
issue in this case is the freedom to love, which freedom might have
been implicated if Hardwick had claimed to be impeded from
developing a lasting emotional attachment, but was not at issue in
a one-night stand. On this alternative understanding of the
Constitution and its protections, those freedoms which are
constitutionally protected are those which the Supreme Court
discerns as being fundamentally agreed-upon intrinsic values.
Therefore, on this argument, the freedom to love receives
constitutional protection because the Court concludes that we all
56. Id at 40 (emphasis added).
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accept love as a fundamental value.
In short, this grounding for our constitutional freedoms
depends on the Court's being as an arbiter, and ultimately an
enforcer, of social values as it perceives them. But, as is reflected in
Bowers, ascribing this role to the Court is extremely nervous-
making. It is possible to identify at least three different statements
of the supposedly agreed-upon values at issue in that case. The
dissent emphasized the traditional understanding of the value of
privacy-the right to be let alone. Garvey maintains a different
value, which he describes as the value of love. Yet the majority
accepted neither of these, and focused instead on the traditional
repugnance towards homosexuals and homosexuality. If Garvey's
argument depends essentially on the idea that the Supreme Court
will identify and effectuate intrinsic values, then the evidence
supplied by Bowers is that the values which were identified and
effectuated in that case were those of homophobia.
This is a problem of general scope. Consider the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,7 in which the Court invalidated as
unconstitutional separate-but-equal public education. Although this
case is not within the scope of Garvey's argument, I would presume
that, to be consistent, Garvey would have to construe that decision
as founded on some agreed-upon value of racial equality. Yet our
view of those times seems to indicate that racial equality was most
plainly not an agreed-upon value and that, to the contrary, racism
was the order of the day. Indeed, even if Brown can be reconciled
with this argument, what of Plessy v. Ferguson?"8 Moreover, without
appealing to blatantly racist premises, it was possible in 1954 to
argue that integration should be avoided because it would prompt
unwanted social and political unrest. Therefore, it seems hard to
justify the Court's decision in Brown as one in which agreed-upon
intrinsic values were protected. In sum, why should the reactions
of nine Justices be held dispositive in matters of great social
controversy when those reactions may very well change over time?
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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Recall, in this connection, that Justice Powell later regarded his
vote in Bowers as an error, and the case mistaken. This grounding
for our freedoms seems like a fragile and unstable foundation for
something so important.
This role for the Court is especially unsettling when applied to
questions of constitutional freedom. We begin our appreciation of
the Bill of Rights with the proposition that these freedoms are
bulwarks against an overly intrusive majority. Hence, the
constitutional protection for some rights, rather than others, seems
to involve some recognition that those rights are not only
profoundly important, but also particularly vulnerable to
oppression. An argument that constitutional freedoms protect
actions which are perceived by the Court as intrinsically valuable
seems to miss this other half of the notion of constitutional
freedoms-that they are constitutionally protected so as to be secure
against the changing tides of social fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, there is a deep irony to the drift of my criticism. My
doubts about Garvey's view of freedom lead me to raise
fundamental questions about the role which he expects the Supreme
Court to fulfill in protecting our constitutional freedoms, and such
questions are ones which, in a standard class in constitutional law,
are introduced by the study of Marbury and McCulloch. Garvey has
argued about our freedoms in a way that raises deep and important
issues of constitutional law, and I wish that he had addressed them
in a more systematic way. But my disappointment in this regard is
based on my keen appreciation for all that he has done. What Are
Freedoms For? is a rich and challenging book, with a fresh and
rewarding view of issues that I wish were more central to
constitutional law.
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